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Photo credit – Hal Samples

I am a scholar of philosophy of science, science and technology studies, and cognitive science. I am currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Texas at Dallas. I am also the Director of the Center for Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology, which organizes research projects, puts on public lectures and conferences, and advocates for understanding and improving the relation between human values and culture with science and technology. I am affiliated with the faculties of Behavioral and Brain SciencesEmerging Media and Communication, and Arts and Technology at UT Dallas.

The main areas of my research and teaching, at present, deal with the intersection of science, broadly construed, with values, broadly construed. I pursue these questions primarily as a philosopher of science.

One of my major projects is a grant funded by the National Science Foundation to study “Engineering Ethics as an Expert Guided and Socially Situated Activity.”

I received my B.S. from the School of Physics at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where I studied with Jon J. JohnstonDavid Finkelstein, Bryan Norton, and Nancy Nersessian.  I received my M.A. and Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Califorina, San Diego, where my dissertation was supervised by Nancy Cartwright and Paul Churchland (and I benefited from many other wonderful faculty).

Recent Posts

Just Published online: “John Dewey’s Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy”

I’m very pleased that you can now find “John Dewey’s Pragmatist Alternative to the Belief-Acceptance Dichotomy” in the online “Articles in press” section at Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A. It’s part of a special issue by Kevin Elliott and Dan McKaughan on Cognitive Attitudes and Values in Science, based on a great workshop organized by Kevin and Don Howard in 2013. You can also find a copy on my Academia.edu page.

I’m glad this is in print, because in many ways it is something of a sequel to my “Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk” paper in Philosophy of Science, in that (1) identifies an additional common tactic for opponents of the value-ladenness of science, the wedge strategy, and (2) it pushes further in the direction of offering a positive alternative to accounts of values in science that avoids the two problems I identified in the earlier paper (the problem of wishful thinking and the lexical priority of evidence over values).

“But wait!” I bet you’re thinking. This is a long paper full of Dewey exegesis, not a first-order argument in philosophy of science like your “Values in Science…” paper. (In this way, it’s also a sequel to my HOPOS paper, “John Dewey’s Logic of Science.”) Well, this is the particular vice of my philosophical thinking—at some point in my thinking on a topic, I tend to spiral through Dewey interpretation, at least for a while. Next comes a paper with less Dewey and more argument (hopefully).

Many thanks to Kevin, Dan, Don, and everyone who provided feedback on the paper!

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